In his famous novel of 1899, the writer Joseph Conrad describes a voyage into the Congolese deep lands as “Descending into the heart of darkness”. Even though what he refers to is a part of the distant colonial past, when the country’s lands were controlled by the Belgians, the current terrifying tendencies of the internal and international politics of the region still reflect the chaos and instability that took place there more than two hundred years ago. Even though the powers in modern-day Congo have shifted over time and lived through dramatic upheavals, such as the Congolese wars of the 1990s, they are still driven to fierce contests over the land’s resources and territories.
The old new story: Pretext for regional rivalries in Central Africa
The central African region has struggled to achieve regional stability for more than 70 years since its decolonization. Building relations between its key actors has always been complicated due to its diverse ethnic composition, which was exacerbated by European statecraft and warfare during the colonization period. While establishing their first connections with the world as independent states, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), the Republic of Congo, Rwanda, Burundi, and Uganda have also experienced an already-familiar political practice: the expansion of foreign influence on regional politics.
Traditionally, the geopolitical ambitions of France and the USSR (followed by the Russian Federation) dominated the region, but nowadays foreign interest extends far beyond just these two powers; involving China, the US, and other European countries. What drives global attention in the region is natural resources, namely, valuable metals and rare earth minerals. The gold, diamonds, tin, cobalt deposits, and a number of other elements in Congo and neighboring countries in the east are considered to be among the largest in the world.
U.S. Government Accountability Office | Wikimedia Commons | U.S. Public Domain)
Re-inventing the Proxy: Instruments of Aggressive Foreign Policies in the Great Lakes Area
The case of the DRC showcases how relatively young powers can develop existential rivalry based almost exclusively on the pursuit of economic assets. The ongoing war with the M23 movement in the east of the country traces back to the 30-year-old Congolese wars fought among Central African countries and their proxies—essentially for the same region. These conflicts were often disguised by the belligerents as righteous ethnic wars. This remains the case nowadays, providing fertile ground for the formation of transnational powers that can be “proxified” to serve individual states’ interests in the region.
The M23 movement emerges at the intersection of local and foreign interests, valuable resources and ethnic diversity. Operating in the DRC (primarily in the eastern territories), Burundi and Uganda, with reported support from Rwanda, the M23 forms a sort of “operational triangle” within the bordering areas of the three countries in a sub-territory also known as the Great Lakes region. The primary characteristic of the M23 is its ambiguous nature: its official self-positioning as a Tutsi militia fighting for ethnic rights and its undisclosed affiliation with specific states and unions allows it to exert its influence wherever a power vacuum arises. Furthermore, the rebel group sometimes acts as a quasi-state of its own, installing “governors”, and “laws” in the controlled territories.
At the same time, these territories, with thousands of people and, of course, dense natural resources deposits that now fall under M23 occupation, find themselves in a “grey zone” of conventional state institutions and international law. A humanitarian crisis has unfolded in eastern DRC, with critical infrastructure torn to the ground and basic necessities in extreme scarcity as the armed conflict was raging for a year interrupted only by short-term ceasefires and power redistribution within rebel groups or neighboring countries.
With the situation becoming exponentially acute, the UN launched an independent series of investigations into the Congolese case. These investigations resulted in the discovery of key M23 standpoints and the most realistic description of the situation in eastern Congo thus far. There is significant evidence that the biggest sources of power for the militia are mineral deposits and Rwanda’s support, reportedly coordinating the group’s offensives, providing troops, and capitalizing on Congolese resources with the help of re-export. While the material aspect of the problem is clearly visible, indecisiveness still tightly grips the civilian population in Rubaya and Kivu. There, the UN investigation findings claim to uncover a chain of human rights violations, including exploitation, critical supplies shortages, crimes of aggression, forced army recruitment and youth radicalization, all of which are still fresh in the memory of those who witnessed the 1990s Congolese wars.
The UN has its own share of experience on the battlefield, although rarely in favour of any kind of international stability. In 2024, the peacekeeping forces of the organization appeared to be caught in a twofold attack, both militarily from the rebel groups and politically from the new Congolese government, which has undertaken measures to “reduce foreign influence” in the country by expelling the UN forces, including those in the contested eastern areas. Shortly afterwards, in early 2025, the M23 began to put pressure on the frontlines. This time both the Congolese and international forces were attacked in their positions—the latter ones attacked even on retreating. Confronting the UN peacekeeping forces is itself a bold political decision even for a quasi-state organization. However, with extensive evidence of Rwandan support for M23 (including, according to the investigation, the direct participation of the country’s regular army) it further underlines the political chaos unfolding over the Great Lakes region over time.
Traces of light in the political darkness: How is the situation mitigated?
The security chaos in the Great Lakes region is indeed protracted, but by no means unsolvable. The main diplomatic effort in regulating it is built around ceasefires between the Congolese army and the M23, which are quite often held with the mediation of local integration state groups such as the African Union, or by separate actors such as Angola or Qatar. Generally, the position of intermediaries tends to lie more towards the sovereignty of the Democratic Republic of Congo and is unlikely to support a compromise between the two parties. This would give the M23 extensive power in the region and tip/tilt the wealth redistribution in Central Africa in Rwanda’s favor. The DRC, recently, has also increased its rare earth metals and minerals development and exports, attracting the West as a viable alternative to Chinese mineral products.
The role of external actors in Central African affairs remains as decisive as ever. Both the European Union and the United States have long been donors to both the DRC and Rwanda, seeing a strategic interest in both countries and trying to hedge their way through their contradictions while extracting maximum value. Rwanda has displayed relatively pro-Western loyalties since the Cold war and the DRC had also leaned more towards trade with the West. To bring their mineral trade partners and reliable places d’armes in the Great Lakes region out of the political heart of darkness, both the US and the EU will need to demonstrate a high-level art of the deal, avoiding radicalizing either side of the conflict against their counterparts and foreign ties, while not being too ignorant of a cause that might cost a share of economic stability for international customers, and take the lives of thousands of Africans still bearing their thorny way through the grey zones of the war.
By Artem Rybalchenko
May 23, 2025
