“Belgium is a failed nation”. This was the diagnosis new Belgian Prime Minister Bart De Wever gave in 2010. Fifteen years after denouncing his country, he’s now its political physician. As the first overtly Flemish nationalist PM, De Wever is aligned with the views of the Flemish movement, an ideology that argues the region of Flanders in northern Belgium should become independent. The former mayor of Antwerp’s accession to the position of Prime Minister following the federal elections in 2024 represents a historic first for Belgium.
A confederal Belgian state, comprising bilingual Brussels, Dutch-speaking Flanders, and French-speaking Wallonia, is De Wever’s dream. Regional wealth disparities in Belgium have contributed to diverging political attitudes within regional borders on issues such as welfare reform, public spending, and taxation. As Wallonia is poorer, they are afforded more mechanisms of fiscal equalization. The federal policy of interregional transfers from Flanders to Wallonia was likened by De Wever as “a drug for a junkie”. Developmental gaps have fueled the development of De Wever’s New Flemish Alliance party that advocates for greater Flemish autonomy and new reforms that continue to cede federal powers to the regions.
In a country with a long history of acquiescing to regional interests for the sake of national unity, the NVA’s success is reigniting the importance of federal reform. In assuming the role of prime minister, De Wever inherits Belgium’s perennial tension between regional and federal politics. This he now must navigate in Brussels rather than merely observe in Antwerp.
In Belgian terms, his government formation after the 2024 federal elections was rather quick. The new coalition includes, apart from the NVA, the two Flemish-based center-left Vooruit and centrist Flemish Christians & Democrats, and the liberal Walloon Mouvement réformateur. Coalition negotiations took 236 days, far less than the 500 days in 2018-2020 and the whopping 589 between 2010-2011. It is important to note that Belgium does not have national parties. Each party operates within their federal region, resulting in highly localized campaigns.
The negotiations coincided with strong performances from the Flemish nationalists Vlaams Belang. As well as being a far-right populist party, the VB also prioritizes immediate independence for Flanders. VB leader Tom Van Grieken shares similar views with De Wever, likening the state to a “forced marriage” regarding the union of Flemish and Walloons.
Though the VB is an established Flemish party, they are barred from federal coalitions through a uniquely Belgian style Cordon Sanitaire. The NVA has co-opted some of their policy issues, such as their opposition to immigration and welfare benefits, but rejects the VB’s policies of unilateral secession and “FLexit”. During the campaign, the NVA positioned itself further to the left than expected, ultimately securing 18% of the aggregate national vote, compared to 15% for the VB. At the Flemish level, support for both parties was significantly higher. The N-VA received 24% while the VB followed closely with 23%, making them the two leading parties in the region.
Dreams of an independent Flemish state will have to take a back seat to urgent national problems. The OECD has warned that ballooning debt and administrative costs are dangers to the structural integrities of Belgium’s extensive welfare system and macroeconomic health. Furthermore, years of military neglect were revealed in the wake of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. De Wever is pushing for higher defense spending, lower taxes and regulations, and the possibility of privatization of certain national industries. His newest national budget includes new austerity measures for public spending, pension and retirement reforms, and a crackdown on unemployment benefits. Defense spending was recently scaled to reach the 2% NATO threshold by 2029.
Even with softening the regionalist NVA manifestos during the campaign, De Wever cannot rely on his coalition to push through legislation. Public responses to the budget have been anything but welcoming. Strikes and protests against the proposals have erupted in Wallonia and Brussels, the other two federal regions. In wealthier Flanders, where financial reform is more stomachable, even the NVA’s stronghold of Antwerp has not been spared from demonstrations. Paradoxically, the VB and the Parti socialiste, the progressive-left Walloon political mainstay, have joined against the reforms.
The peculiar system of Belgian federalism limits the extent of reform that governments can take. There are six separate administrative units controlling most public policy areas; broken into three language communities and three federal regions. The process of constitutional revisions, or state reforms, represent mechanisms to change regional and federal responsibilities. These have occurred six times in Belgium, but in each instance transferred power to the communities and regions. The extensive structural change desired by De Wever risks swimming against both the tide of regionalism that he helped foster in Flanders and the long arc of decentralization in the country.
In that regard Belgium could perhaps be described as the microcosm of the European Union: fitting as Brussels serves as the national and continental seat of political affairs for both entities. Political squabbling, multilingualism, complex channels of administration, and an emphasis on consensus sometimes paralyzes reform. While frustrating, those features generally serve as a shield when nationalist, or in this case regionalist, figures enter their political spaces. De Wever is trying to paint his reforms as pragmatic measures, slightly distancing his Flemish-tinted preferences for the sake of the nation. While his end game may very well continue to be a confederal state, the nature of Belgian politics necessitates finesse and compromise on his journey to do so.
By Stephen Chilimidos
May 27, 2025
