Chinese leaders present their growing influence as the basis for a more peaceful world order built on cooperation and dialogue rather than the current liberal order, which they characterize as selfish and conflictual. Yet, Xi Jinping describes reunification with Taiwan as “unstoppable” and openly keeps the option of force on the table.
This raises the key question of whether China’s promised vision of a peaceful world order can be trusted, or if China is becoming what it swore to replace.
While China’s growing role in global politics is widely seen as inevitable, the consequences of this shift remain uncertain. To better understand this phenomenon, let’s begin with China’s rhetoric.
China presents its foreign policy as peaceful and cooperative and official rhetoric stresses dialogue over conflict and mutual respect between large and small nations. This aligns with previous policy, dating back to Zhou Enlai’s five principles in the 1950s, which promised that China’s rise would not come at the expense of smaller nations. Today, China’s leading slogan of building a “community with a shared future for mankind” further reinforces this message.
Yet, recent developments raise questions about this cooperative narrative. Under Xi Jinping, rhetoric has hardened. Reunification with Taiwan is now framed as essential in national rejuvenation, with Taiwan and mainland China portrayed as inseparable parts of “one China”.
Rhetoric has also been accompanied by action. China has increased military pressure on Taiwan, including disinformation campaigns as well as growing numbers of military drills around the island. Drills in late 2025 were described as notably larger in scale than previously, emphasizing the rising tensions.
China’s recent rhetoric and behaviour raise the question of whether power dynamics outweigh cooperative commitments. China’s growing global influence and military capacity could lead to a pursuit of a larger degree of regional control. This approach could also align with China’s outspoken priorities for territorial consolidation in Hong Kong, the South China Sea, and Taiwan.
Such an approach, however, would come into conflict with its proclaimed role as a peaceful power prioritizing cooperation over force.
Instead, China seeks to legitimize its claim over Taiwan through appeals to shared identity, history and collective belonging. Beijing’s rhetoric presents Taiwan as an indisputable part of mainland China, making the dispute appear domestic in nature.
It can further be argued that there is some legitimization from the Taiwanese side to support this view through the so-called “1992 consensus”, which states that there is one China, albeit with different interpretations. Moreover, there are even “one China” elements in the Taiwanese constitution, with rhetoric emphasizing “national unification” between the “free area” and mainland China.
Taken together, China can, from this point of view, be seen as caring for a brother gone rogue rather than encroaching on another country’s sovereignty.
However, since 1992, Taiwan has undergone a major political change with the implementation of democracy. This shift has allowed new political actors to reshape cross-strait relations, perhaps most notably the Taiwanese people themselves. This can be seen in public displays of opposition toward closer relations with Beijing as well as in landslide electoral victories for the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), a party that advocates a sovereign Taiwan while rejecting the idea of being a part of “one China”.
Even the opposition party, the Kuomintang (KMT), reportedly doubts the ‘one China’ concept despite its history of supporting reunification. The party keeps the constitution intact primarily to avoid provoking Beijing.
Taiwanese opposition toward the idea of reunification is further reflected in a changing identity. According to surveys, the share of the population identifying themselves as solely Taiwanese has increased from around a fifth in the 1990s to around two-thirds in 2021, while those identifying as Chinese have fallen to just a few per cent.
Beijing’s appeals to a shared identity and collective belonging can no longer be seen as mutual, which weakens the perception that the dispute is an internal affair. Beijing’s nationalistic arguments to legitimize a potential annexation of Taiwan even risk resembling elements of imperialist reasoning.
Taken together, Beijing appears to rely on framing the dispute as an internal affair to justify its policy on Taiwan without openly contradicting its promises of cooperation and peaceful development. Yet this perception is increasingly losing credibility as the two actors drift further apart, both politically and socially.
The central question, then, is whether China remains committed to its promises of cooperation and peace, or whether arguments based on power dynamics carry more weight in a world where power politics appears to be resurging. With Russia waging war on its neighbor for territorial expansion and the United States reviving elements of the Monroe Doctrine to assert dominance in its hemisphere, Beijing may apply the same logic to Taiwan. In doing so, it may, however, mirror the very behaviour it swore to replace.
By Lukas Arenbo
March 13, 2026
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