For quite some time, the region described as the “Middle East” has been characterized by intense mutual interactions among its constituent states. In order to comprehend the problems, disputes, and conflicts in the region, it is imperative to grasp the essence of these issues in their totality rather than relying on surface-level analysis. Accordingly, in a previous article, we discussed how the Kurdish peace process in Turkey has been characterized and identified the motivations of each party involved.
This article is an opinion piece whose contents represent the standpoint of its author and not UPF Lund or The Perspective’s editorial board.
To briefly recall the core ideologies behind that process, they include anti-republicanism, anti-communism, and articulation with imperial actors. Building on this perspective and taking into consideration the Kurdish region in Syria known as Rojava, as well as the regime change in Syria, these incidents have taught us several critical lessons. By synthesizing the recent Kurdish peace process in Turkey, let us dive into the Syrian context and take a bird’s-eye view to answer the question: what actually happened in Syria?
The landscape of the Syrian conflict shifted on December 8, 2024, when President Bashar al-Assad was toppled by a coalition of rebel groups, most notably Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) and the Turkish-backed Syrian National Army (SNA). This transition saw Ahmed al-Sharaa, widely known by his nom de guerre Abu Mohammad al-Julani, rise to power. While the international community—including the United States (US), the European Union (EU), and Turkey—expressed satisfaction with this regime change and moved toward cordial relations with the new Syrian administration, the status of Rojava remained a contested variable. Led by the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), this Kurdish-led autonomous region had gained legitimacy through its successful campaign against the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIS) and its subsequent alliance with the US.
Despite their desire for continued autonomy, the US pressured the SDF to integrate into the new central government with all its military and political powers. Although Mazlum Abdi, the commander of the SDF, expressed disappointment with the resulting agreements, external pressure from Turkey and the US eventually forced a nominal commitment to a “United Syria“. Crucially, the resulting agreement lacked concrete protections for Kurdish rights; Kurdish was not recognized as an official language, and concessions were limited to symbolic cultural festivals.
The first lesson from this transition is that prolonged military service against ISIS and a formal alliance with the US do not guarantee long-term protection. If imperialist actors find a different ruling system more “controllable”, they will not hesitate to abandon former proxies. This does not necessarily mean that imperial actors, such as the US, favor traditional nation-states. Their goal is rather to maintain the SDF as a localized, municipal governing model or a cluster of manageable entities under the Julani administration. This strategy ensures the region remains fragmented and susceptible to external influence. A truly united, sovereign state often contradicts imperial interests. This perspective also explains the Turkish-Kurdish peace process, as Turkey (a regional imperial actor) and the US (a global imperial power) urged the SDF—often associated with the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK)—to integrate quickly into the new Syrian order to serve broader strategic interests.
A second lesson involves deconstructing the mainstream narrative that the US is inherently opposed to radical Islamist movements. While the US frequently criticizes the Iranian regime’s reactionary elements, labeling them enemies of progress, it has simultaneously supported Islamist figures in Syria when those figures align with Western strategic goals. Julani, a former al-Qaida militant with a well-documented jihadist background, is now a tolerated partner because his administration serves current imperial interests.
This illustrates that labels like “terrorist” or “undesirable” are often applied based on whether an actor opposes or facilitates imperialist goals, rather than the actor’s specific ideology or past actions. Turkey has followed a similar trajectory, sidelining secular Kurdish forces in favor of Islamist actors like Julani to further its regional agenda.
Finally, the regime change has significantly weakened the “Axis of Resistance”—the regional coalition comprising Iran, Hezbollah in Lebanon, and Palestinian resistance movements against the US-Israel alliance. Bashar al-Assad was a cornerstone of this axis. His removal has allowed the regional ambitions of Israel, the US, and Turkey to materialize more fully. A symbolic yet profound indicator of this shift is found in the new Syrian maps published under Julani’s administration. Despite his code name “al-Julani” referring to the Golan Heights, the new maps have notably omitted the Golan Heights, a territory claimed by Israel. This suggests a surrender of territorial claims in exchange for political recognition.
Ultimately, the events in Syria mirror the characteristics of the Kurdish peace process in Turkey: they are driven by anti-republicanism (manifested in jihadist replacement) and anti-communism (manifested as imperialist interest). Without these analytical lenses, the true nature of the region remains opaque.
By Osman Yildirim
February 26, 2026
